Business, 07.12.2019 21:31, isahbellas

Sobre una caja se aplican las siguientes fuerzas
f1=200n,30°
f2=200n,150°
¿cual es la magnitud resultante?

Answers: 1

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Sobre una caja se aplican las siguientes fuerzas
f1=200n,30°
f2=200n,150°
¿cual es la...