What motivating impulse may prompt individuals to agree to requests that do not directly benefit themselves or their organizations?

Suppose that a worker in agland can produce either 10 units of organic grain or 2 units of incense per year, and a worker in zenland can produce either 5 units of organic grain or 15 units of incense per year. there are 20 workers in agland and 10 workers in zenland. currently the two countries do not trade. agland produces and consumes 100 units of grain and 20 units of incense per year. zenland produces and consumes 50 units of grain and no incense per year. if each country made the decision to specialize in producing the good in which it has a comparative advantage, then the combined yearly output of the two countries would increase by a. 30 units of grain and 100 units of incense. b. 30 units of grain and 150 units of incense. c. 50 units of grain and 90 units of incense. d. 50 units of grain and 130 units of ince

How is challah bread made? if i have to dabble the recipe?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?