Which of the following is not a control over the risk of unauthorized inventory purchases?

a. transaction authorization

b. automated purchase approval

c. scanner technology

d. all of the above are controls over the risk of unauthorized inventory purchases.

Afood worker has just rinsed a dish after cleaning it. what should he do next?

The east asiatic company (eac), a danish company with subsidiaries throughout asia, has been funding its bangkok subsidiary primarily with u. s. dollar debt because of the cost and availability of dollar capital as opposed to thai baht-denominated (b) debt. the treasurer of eac-thailand is considering a 1-year bank loan for $247,000.the current spot rate is b32.03 /$, and the dollar-based interest is 6.78% for the 1-year period. 1-year loans are 12.04% in baht. a. assuming expected inflation rates of 4.3 % and 1.24% in thailand and the united states, respectively, for the coming year, according to purchase power parity, what would the effective cost of funds be in thai baht terms? b. if eac's foreign exchange advisers believe strongly that the thai government wants to push the value of the baht down against the dollar by5% over the coming year (to promote its export competitiveness in dollar markets), what might the effective cost of funds end up being in baht terms? c. if eac could borrow thai baht at 13% per annum, would this be cheaper than either part (a) or part (b) above?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?