The article discusses how it is good to be near a trading partner—especially a rich trading partner—for two reasons: a) it is cheaper to trade with a close trading partner than one that is far away and b) a rich trading partner offers more opportunities for trade than a poor one. as the article points out, germany benefits as the neighboring country, france, becomes wealthier.
consistent with this argument, the states on the west coast of the united states have seen rapid economic growth as
east asia has experienced rapid economic growth.
2-in contrast, states along the east coast should see slow economic growth and possibly even a decline as the economy of
europe stagnates.

Taking commercial paper means the holder acts honestly

Southeastern oklahoma state university's business program has the facilities and faculty to handle an enrollment of 2,000 new students per semester. however, in an effort to limit class sizes to a "reasonable" level (under 200 generally), southeastern's dean, holly lutze, placed a ceiling on enrollment of 1,600 new students. although there was ample demand for business courses last semester, conflicting schedules allowed only 1,440 new students to take business courses. the utilization rate for southeastern=%the efficiency rate for southeastern=%

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?