Two people take turns removing stones from a pile of n stones. each person may, on each of her turns, remove either one stone or two stones. the person who takes the last stone is the winner; she gets $1 from her opponent. find the subgame perfect equilibria of the games that model this situation for n = 1 and n = 2. find the winner in each subgame perfect equilibrium for n = 3, using the fact that the subgame following player 1’s removal of one stone is the game for n = 2 in which player 2 is the first-mover, and the subgame following player 1’s removal of two stones is the game for n = 1 in which player 2 is the first mover?

This is true for sure

Ithink the answer is b

$527.7.if the following was the question  $527.7 is the answer.students who are trying to raise funds have an agreement with a local pizza chain. the chain has agreed to sell them pizzas at a discount, which the students can then resell to families in the local community for a profit. it is expected that of the 500 families in the community, at most 70% will buy pizza. based on a survey of their personal preferences, the students believe that they should order no more than 120 cheese pizzas, no more than 150 pepperoni pizzas, and no more than 100 vegetarian pizzas. they also want to make sure that at least 20% of the total pizzas are cheese and at least 50% of the pizzas are pepperoni. they make a profit of $1.45, $1.75, and $1.98, respectively, for each cheese, pepperoni, and vegetarian pizza they resell. how many pizzas of each type should they buy?