Anne-marie cole runs the sales division for a local auto insurance firm. one of her key duties is to calculate her company's market share. when evaluating the prior year's numbers, she found that her firm achieved total sales of $3 million and the entire industry had $30 million in sales. what is anne-marie's current market share?

In a sumif conditional function, what should be the order of terms in the parentheses?

Burke enterprises is considering a machine costing $30 billion that will result in initial after-tax cash savings of $3.7 billion at the end of the first year, and these savings will grow at a rate of 2 percent per year for 11 years. after 11 years, the company can sell the parts for $5 billion. burke has a target debt/equity ratio of 1.2, a beta of 1.79. you estimate that the return on the market is 7.5% and t-bills are currently yielding 2.5%. burke has two issuances of bonds outstanding. the first has 200,000 bonds trading at 98% of par, with coupons of 5%, face of $1000, and maturity of 5 years. the second has 500,000 bonds trading at par, with coupons of 7.5%, face of $1000, and maturity of 12 years. kate, the ceo, usually applies an adjustment factor to the discount rate of +2 for such highly innovative projects. should the company take on the project?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?