Farmer and taylor formed a partnership with capital contributions of $200,000 and $250,000, respectively. their partnership agreement calls for farmer to receive a $70,000 per year salary. the remaining income or loss is to be divided equally. if the net income for the current year is $135,000, then farmer and taylor's respective shares are:
a. $67,500: $67,500.
b. $130,000; $5,000.
c. $106,140; s28.860
d. $90,000; $45,000.
e. $102,500. s32.500.

Rossdale co. stock currently sells for $68.91 per share and has a beta of 0.88. the market risk premium is 7.10 percent and the risk-free rate is 2.91 percent annually. the company just paid a dividend of $3.57 per share, which it has pledged to increase at an annual rate of 3.25 percent indefinitely. what is your best estimate of the company's cost of equity?

Brody corp. uses a process costing system in which direct materials are added at the beginning of the process and conversion costs are incurred uniformly throughout the process. beginning inventory for january consisted of 1,050 units that were 65% completed. 10,900 units were started into the process during january. on january 31, the inventory consisted of 500 units that were 50% completed. what would be the equivalent units for direct materials cost using the weighted average method?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?