The debits to work in process—assembly department for april, together with data concerning production, are as follows: april 1, work in process: materials cost, 3,000 units $ 7,200conversion costs, 3,000 units, 60% completed 6,000materials added during april, 10,000 units 25,000conversion costs during april 35,750goods finished during april, 12,000 units 0april 30 work in process, 1,000 units, 40% completed 0all direct materials are added at the beginning of the process, and the first-in, first-out method is used to cost inventories. the materials cost per equivalent unit for april is

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?