Some racing horse breeders keep a few of their foals and sell the others. generally, they put the poorest quality foals up for sale early in the season. buyers have limited information about the foals up for sale, but they know that the first foals from some breeders will not be good racers. other breeders sell all their foals. since buyers cannot know which breeders are keeping back their good foals, they are suspicious of all foals offered for sale early in the season, lowering the sale prices. breeders who sell all their foals are therefore forced to hold back their better foals until later in the season, to get true market prices for them. the market for foals is therefore subject to thea. adverse selection problemb. moral hazard problemc. free-rider effectd. none of the above

Compare the sources of consumer credit 1. consumers use a prearranged loan using special checks 2. consumers use cards with no interest and non -revolving balances 3. consumers pay off debt and credit is automatically renewed 4. consumers take out a loan with a repayment date and have a specific purpose a. travel and entertainment credit b. revolving check credit c. closed-end credit d. revolving credit

Buyer henry is going to accept seller shannon's $282,500 counteroffer. when will this counteroffer become a contract. a. counteroffers cannot become contracts b. when henry gives shannon notice of the acceptance c. when henry signs the counteroffer d. when shannon first made the counteroffer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?