Your company is starting a new r& d initiative: a development of a new drug that dramatically reduces the addiction to smoking. the expert team estimates the probability of developing the drug succesfully at 60% and a chance of losing the investment of 40%. if the project is successful, your company would earn profits (after deducting the investment) of 9,000 (thousand usd). if the development is unsuccessful, the whole investment will be lost -1,000 (thousand usd). your company's risk preference is given by the expected utility function: u(x) v1000 +x, where x is the monetary outcome of a project. calculate the expected profit of the project . calculate the expected utility of the project . find the certainty equivalent of this r& d initiative . find the risk premium of this r& d initiative e is the company risk-averse, risk-loving or risk-neutral? why do you think so?

If the findings and the results are not presented properly, the research completed was a waste of time and money. true false

Plastic and steel are substitutes in the production of body panels for certain automobiles. if the price of plastic increases, with other things remaining the same, we would expect: a) the demand curve for plastic to shift to the left. b) the price of steel to fall. c) the demand curve for steel to shift to the left d) nothing to happen to steel because it is only a substitute for plastic. e) the demand curve for steel to shift to the right

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?