Given the following items and costs as of the balance sheet date, determine the value of faltron company's merchandise inventory. - $1,000 goods sold by faltron to another company. the goods are in transit and shipping terms are fob destination. - $2,000 goods sold by another company to faltron. the goods are in transit and shipping terms are fob destination. - $3,000 owned by faltron but in the possession of another company the consignee. - damaged goods owned by faltron which originally cost $4,000 but which now have a $500 net realizable value

You are frustrated to find that the only way to contact the customer service department is to make a phone call. the number listed would result in long distance charges to your phone bill. which issue should be addressed by the company to keep its crm in line with your expectations?

Acontractor was awarded a purchase order for commercial items for $1.5 million under the authority of far subpart 13.5. the purchase order was issued in november 2010 and containedall applicable clauses that were current as of the date of the purchase order. under the purchase order, the contractor is required to comply with a small business subcontracting plan that contains all of the required elements. which of the following is true? a. the contractor must submit a standard form 294, subcontracting report for individual contracts. b. the contractor must submit an individual subcontracting report through the electronic subcontracting reporting system (esrs). c. the contractor may submit either an sf 294 or report its subcontracting through esrs. d. the contractor is not required to submit any subcontracting reports.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?