1. describe the ja finance park program and what it aims to teach students. 2. in what capacity do volunteers work with students during the simulation? 3. explain the purpose of the kiosks during the simulation. 4. explain why william anderson went into teaching. 5. describe the wealth effect game and how it students to learn about finances. 6. what is anderson hoping to do as a next step and why?

You plan to invest some money in a bank account. which of the following banks provides you with the highest effective rate of interest? hint: perhaps this problem requires some calculations. bank 1; 6.1% with annual compounding. bank 2; 6.0% with monthly compounding. bank 3; 6.0% with annual compounding. bank 4; 6.0% with quarterly compounding. bank 5; 6.0% with daily (365-day) compounding.

crow design, inc. is a web site design and consulting firm. the firm uses a job order costing system in which each client is a different job. crow design assigns direct labor, licensing costs, and travel costs directly to each job. it allocates indirect costs to jobs based on a predetermined overhead allocation rate, computed as a percentage of direct labor costs. direct labor hours (professional) 6,250 hours direct labor costs ($1,800,000 support staff salaries ,000 computer ,000 office ,000 office ,000 in november 2012, crow design served several clients. records for two clients appear here: delicious treats mesilla chocolates direct labor 700 hours 100 hours software licensing $ 4,000 $400 travel costs 8,000 1. compute crow design’s direct labor rate and its predetermined indirect cost allocation rate for 2012. 2. compute the total cost of each job. 3. if simone wants to earn profits equal to 50% of service revenue, how much (what fee) should she charge each of these two clients? 4. why does crow design assign costs to jobs?

Managers in a firm hired to improve the firm's profitability and ultimately the shareholders' value will add to the overall costs if they pursue their own self-interests. what does this best illustrate? a. diseconomies of scale b. principal-agent problem c. experience-curveeffects d. information asymmetries