Which description best fits andrews? for clarity: - a differentiator competes through good designs, high awareness, and easy accessibility. - a cost leader competes on price by reducing costs and passing the savings to customers. - a broad player competes in all parts of the market. - a niche player competes in selected parts of the market. which of these four statements best describes your company's current strategy? select: 1save answer andrews is a niche cost leader andrews is a broad cost leader andrews is a broad differentiator andrews is a niche differentiator?

If the guide wprds on the page are "crochet " and "crossbones", which words would not be on the page. criticize, crocodile, croquet, crouch, crocus.

Skychefs, inc. prepares in-flight meals for a number of major airlines. one of the company's products is grilled salmon in dill sauce with baby new potatoes and spring vegetables. during the most recent week, the company prepared 4000 of these meals using 960 direct labor hours. the company paid these direct labor workers a total of $19,200 for this work, or $20.00 per hour. according to standard cost card for this meal, it should require 0.25 direct labour-hours at a cost of $19.75 per hour.1. what is the standard labor-hours allowed (sh) to prepare 4,000 meals? 2. what is the standard labor cost allowed (sh x sr) to prepare 4,000 meals? 3. what is the labor spending variance? 4. what is the labor rate variance and the labor efficiency variance?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?